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I. INTRODUCTION  
An undocumented immigrant is arrested, sitting in a Rikers prison cell, and, as a matter of law, 
a criminal facing deportation. He is only seventeen has been transient, depending on a resistant 
sibling for shelter or living on the streets. He is detained for two months without ever speaking to 
an attorney, and, upon release, is immediately picked up by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”), designated as an unaccompanied minor, and transferred into the custody of 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”). He is examined by a psychiatrist who determines 
that his cognitive functions are severely impaired. He struggles to communicate but eventually 
reveals a long history of physical abuse and a solitary, traumatic journey from his home in Mexico 
to New York at the age of ten. He has no family willing to care for him, struggles in school due to 
his limited comprehension, and eventually resorts to petty theft in order to eat.  
 Once in ORR custody, he has an opportunity to meet an immigration attorney who assesses 
his eligibility for relief, but his mental deteriorates rapidly. He does not remember dates and details, 
although his account of the abuse he has endured remains consistent. His journey to legal status 
has just begun, but his experiences and trauma will continue to present obstacles moving forward.1 
What he has endured is, unfortunately, not unique. Instead, it is indicative of the experiences 
and challenges faced by undocumented children in the United States. In the increasingly hostile 
political climate for immigrants, the absence of protections and the promulgation of restrictive 
policies have left more and more children in immigration custody in administrative limbo.2 Those 
policies have stripped those not in custody of the guaranteed representation necessary to make 
 
1 SUSAN J. TERRIO, WHOSE CHILD AM I? UNACCOMPANIED, UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 
CUSTODY 175-80 (University of California Press) (2015). The facts from this anecdote reflect the story of an actual 
child documented in Terrio’s book. She conducted a series of interviews with the child’s case manager, foster mother, 
and attorney, reviewed confidential legal files, and attended an immigration hearing to piece together an account of 
the child’s story. 
2 Vivian Yee & Miriam Jordan, Migrant Children in Search of Justice: A 2-Year Old’s Day in Immigration Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrant-children-family-separation-court.html. 
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any—let alone an effective—claim for relief.3 Expected to state and defend their claims for relief, 
immigrant children are facing linguistic, cultural, intellectual, and psychological hurdles on their 
path to legal status against the legal expertise of government attorneys.4  
In a system where a person’s future is often entirely dependent on a finding of credibility,5 
children bear the heavy burden of proving that they are eligible for and legally entitled to 
immigration relief.6 The immigration courts decidedly depart from the safeguards recognized in 
the United States criminal and juvenile systems and, instead, steadfastly commit to a rigid 
framework delineated by the INA.7 Despite children’s unique vulnerabilities, “immigration courts 
make no allowance for developmental immaturity, cultural incapacity, or special vulnerability” 
and “lack meaningful safeguards for children [. . .] with mental disorders and cognitive 
impairments who are in removal proceedings.”8 While the criminal and juvenile delinquency court 
systems have recognized and evolved as awareness has increased regarding the impacts of age and 
competency,9 the immigration system lags far behind. This paper argues that, where the American 
 
3 Id.  
4 Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dismantled what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”) and created three separate immigration enforcement agencies: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”).  6 U.S.C.A. § 
251. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 restructured the Department of Homeland Security with the stated intention 
of combatting the risks posed by terrorism, including the “exploitable liability” of open borders. H.R. REP. NO. 107-
609, at 64 (2002). The creation of separate arms of DHS’s immigration enforcement infrastructure leaves USCIS 
charged with the adjudication of immigrant visa petitions, naturalization petitions, asylum and refugee applications, 
and all other immigration benefits. 6 U.S.C.A. § 271. Further, the Act delegated authority for the care and treatment 
of immigrant children in federal custody to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. 6 U.S.C.A. § 279. 
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2019).  
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2019). The one form of relief available specifically to children, Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), requires that a child be dependent on the State and unable to reunify with one or both parents 
because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Even though SIJS recognizes the unique 
position faced by immigrant children, its recognition does not extend beyond the single immigration application 
designated for these abandoned, abused, and neglected children. Id. Furthermore, this special classification still does 
not confer on immigrant children a right to a government-funded representative outside of the family or juvenile court 
setting. Id. 
7 TERRIO, supra note 1, at 162.  
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Roper v. Simmons, 542 
U.S. 551 (2005). 
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immigration system fails to recognize the developmental needs of children and mandate 
government-funded representation and protections for them, children in immigration proceedings 
are deprived of access to the relief to which they are entitled and, thus, to procedural due process. 
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the body of laws governing immigration 
proceedings and, specifically, children. Part II discusses the scholarly literature and examines the 
two primary theoretical bases for which scholars have argued for government-funded 
representation: a constitutional argument and a children’s rights-based approach. Part III explores 
the rationales and approaches adopted in the criminal, family, and juvenile delinquency systems. 
Part IV discusses studies that have delved into questions of children’s brains and cognitive 
development and the legal implications. Part V concludes by proposing recommendations for the 
redress of immigration law’s weaknesses in the treatment of children. 
II.  LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
Courtrooms, by their nature, invoke a sense of apprehension, uncertainty, and, often, fear.10 
The room is arranged to be adversarial, with a single judge or panel of judges positioned in front 
of the parties to the proceeding, regardless of whether the proceedings are legally adversarial or 
administrative. 11 Despite the potentially severe consequences of an adverse immigration decision, 
the law deems immigration proceedings to be civil actions.12 This classification effectively denies 
respondents in immigration proceedings the right to government-funded counsel that is afforded 
to criminal or delinquent defendants under the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and the 
Constitution’s guarantees of procedural due process and fundamental fairness.13 In defending the 
 
10 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-immigrants-face-deportation.html.  
11 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).  
12 Id. at 1038. 
13 Id.  
 4 
classification of removal proceedings as civil in nature, the Supreme Court reasoned in I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza that the purpose of a deportation proceeding is to determine eligibility to remain 
in the United States and not to punish unlawful presence, although the Court did acknowledge that 
a “judge’s sole power is to order deportation.”14 This paper argues that immigration proceedings 
fit squarely into legal frameworks adapted to criminal and delinquency law, and as such, the 
constitutional interests at stake are more akin to those of a criminal or juvenile dependent than a 
party to an administrative proceeding. This section provides a general overview of some of the 
legal frameworks that govern the processes undergone by undocumented immigrant children. 
A. THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The reality of the American immigration system is that immigration courts increasingly mirror 
and are intertwined with the criminal system.15 The costs of adverse immigration decisions can 
result in life-altering consequences and losses of liberty and opportunity.16  Unlike the criminal 
system, a right to government-funded counsel17 does not apply to immigrant respondents.18 
Despite the liberty interests at stake in immigration and removal proceedings, the courts have 
 
14 Id. 
15 See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in Adversarial Administrative 
Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 108 
(2007) (explaining that “[d]eportation itself not only increasingly looks like a criminal punishment, but also the 
proceeding itself now shares some of the most fundamental characteristics of a criminal proceedings”). The overlap 
between the criminal system and qualification for most forms of immigration relief renders any claim that the two 
bodies of law are separate and apart moot. Id. Even relatively minor offenses classified as “crimes of moral turpitude” 
may carry with them the possibility of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(1)(2)(A)(i) (2019). The Immigration Court 
frequently interprets criminal law in order to determine eligibility for immigration relief, often resting immigration 
decisions on the same evidence used to reach decisions in criminal prosecutions. Kidane, supra note 16, at 110.  
16 Shani M. King, Child Migrants and America’s Evolving Immigration Mission, 32 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 88-89 
(2019). (“While violence is a significant "push factor" behind recent migrant surges, so too is poverty and fleeing 
migrants desire to reconnect with family members in the United States. In addition to ranking among the world's most 
dangerous places, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are also among the poorest--with more than one-third of 
employed people surviving on incomes of less than $ 4 a day. Thus, while many UACs have valid claims for political 
asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief and are thus entitled to remain in the country, others do not. Such a mixed 
flow of migrants poses significant challenges to the American immigration system, which must balance the need to 
maintain border controls with the responsibility to protect genuinely vulnerable children.”).   
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
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maintained that, because of the civil classification of immigration law, an absence of counsel does 
not automatically equate to a denial of procedural due process and fundamental fairness.19  
Because the Court’s Sixth Amendment interpretations have limited a right to government-
funded counsel to criminal and delinquency defendants,20 the Courts have rarely found access to 
counsel claims viable in the immigration context.21 Indeed, courts have only found a violation of 
an immigrant’s right to counsel in immigration proceedings where the immigration courts entirely 
denied the respondent access to counsel.22 This is because the right of access to counsel in this 
context is limited to the rights to a reasonable opportunity to find counsel,23 to have counsel present 
in the courtroom,24 and against deprivation of counsel based on personal animosities.25  
The Supreme Court has not construed the Fifth Amendment’s provision of procedural due 
process to guarantee a right to counsel in administrative cases such as immigration proceedings.26 
The Court adopted a three-factor balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge27 assess what process is 
 
19 See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975) (“In petitioner’s case the absence of counsel 
at his hearing before the Immigration Judge did not deprive his deportation proceeding of fundamental fairness. . . 
The lack of counsel before the Immigration Judge did not prevent full administrative consideration of his argument. 
Counsel could have obtained no different administrative result. ‘Fundamental fairness,’ therefore, was not abridged 
during the administrative proceedings, and the order of deportation is not subject to constitutional attack for a lack of 
due process.”).  
20 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, supra note 11 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to a 
respondent in an immigration proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967) (holding that individuals in juvenile 
court are entitled to specific due process guarantees, including the right to meaningful representation of counsel).  
21 See, e.g., Castro-Nuno v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that the respondent had been unjustly 
denied a right to counsel after the immigration judge flatly refused to continue a deportation hearing to allow him to 
locate counsel). 
22 Note, The Right to Be Heard From Immigration Prisons: Locating a Right of Access to Counsel for Immigration 
Detainees in the Right of Access to Courts, 132 HARV. L. REV. 726, 731 (2018). 
23 See, e.g., Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that aliens must be provided with 
reasonable time to locate counsel and to allow counsel to prepare for the hearing).  
24 See, e.g., Castro-Nuno, supra note 21, at 579 (determining that the respondent had been unjustly denied a right to 
counsel after the immigration judge refused to continue a deportation hearing to allow him to locate counsel). 
25 See, e.g., Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding deprivation of right to counsel where 
immigration judge denied respondent access to attorney because of the judge’s negative opinion about attorney). 
26 Henriques v. I.N.S., 465 F.2d 119, 120 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[W]e can agree with, and follow, the majority in 
Argersinger and Gideon, each involving the sixth amendment and criminal cases, without reaching a blanket rule that 
the fifth amendment requires, as a matter of due process, counsel for indigent aliens in deportation cases, regardless 
of their nature.”). 
27 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 6 
due to an individual once a protected liberty interest is found to be implicated in an administrative 
case. The Mathews test balances three distinct elements of the analysis: (1) the individual’s private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 
interest and the probable value of the procedural safeguard; and (3) the government’s interests at 
stake, such as costs and burdens of implementation of the safeguard.28 The Court explained: “The 
essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] 
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’ …All that is necessary is that the 
procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of 
those who are to be heard’ …to [e]nsure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present 
their case.”29 However, the Mathews test has been criticized for often skewing the balancing of 
interests in favor of the government and for its inadequacy in addressing the “Civil Gideon” issue, 
i.e., the basic procedural right to counsel.30 
Despite the shortcomings of the Mathews test, the courts have consistently applied this 
standard to assess whether a right to counsel would be necessary to satisfy the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ requirements of due process and fundamental fairness.31 In Lassiter v. Dep’t of 
Social Services of Durham County, N.C., the Supreme Court held that the due process requirement 
of “fundamental fairness” mandates a right to appointed counsel when a litigant may be deprived 
 
28 Id. at 334-35. 
29 Id. at 348-50. 
30 Stan Keillor, James H. Cohen, & Mercy Changwesha, The Inevitable, if Untrumpeted, March Toward “Civil 
Gideon”, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 469, 481 (2014) (“The Mathews v.  Eldridge balancing test not only ignores the 
dignitary value of added process, but also skews the result in favor of governmental interests. As Reich points out, 
‘Mathews v. Eldridge represents an outlook that treats the government’s claims as having greater urgency than the 
claims of individuals.’ This may be an appropriate approach for incremental safeguards, such as the right to present 
post-hearing argument. But it is completely inadequate for a protection as fundamental as the assistance of counsel in 
an adversarial proceeding. …The inadequacy of the Mathews v. Eldridge test in this context is illustrated by both 
Lassiter and Turner.”). 
31 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (using the Mathews test 
to analyze a right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (using the 
Mathews test to analyze a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings); Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19 (using 
the Mathews test to analyze a right to counsel in immigration proceedings).  
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of his physical liberty.32 The Court in Lassiter, a termination of parental rights case, denied the 
parents a right to counsel and emphasized a presumption against a right to counsel where there 
was no threat of incarceration, citing a number of criminal cases in which the Court determined 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right.33 Seemingly conflating the limitations of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel with the scope of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ procedural 
rights, the Court established a limited procedural right to counsel where the personal interest at 
stake is the person’s freedom,34 effectively making the Mathews analysis of private interests a 
comparison between of civil and criminal liberty interests.35 However, the Court’s emphasis on 
physical liberty interests in Lassiter has opened the door for respondents in immigration 
proceedings who face the possibility of detention or removal from the United States,36  with some 
courts even arguing that freedom from immigration detention and the “significant risk that the 
individual will be needlessly deprived of the fundamental right to liberty” were at the core of the 
liberty interests imagined in the Constitution’s due process procedural rights.37 
 Notably, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that removal is a severe penalty akin to the 
interests at stake in a criminal proceeding, although not a criminal sanction in a strict sense.38 
Although immigration law’s proximity to the criminal system has not compelled the Court to 
acknowledge a Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, the Court in Padilla v. Kennedy 
acknowledged that immigrants in criminal proceedings have a Sixth Amendment right to effective 
 
32 Lassiter, supra note 31, at 26-27. 
33 Id. at 25-27. 
34 Id. 
35 Stan Keillor, et al, supra note 30, at 482. 
36 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017).  
37 Id. at 993. 
38 Padilla v. Kennedy, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
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counsel, 39 reasoning that the Court’s ruling in Strickland40 applied to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where the collateral consequence of the representation was deportation.41 
While a right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings has not been recognized 
by the Supreme Court, the First Circuit in Lozada v. I.N.S. has recognized a narrow window for 
these claims42; where, due to ineffective representation, “the proceeding was so fundamentally 
unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case,” an immigrant respondent 
may have a viable procedural due process claim.43  
The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) set out a strict framework for assessing whether 
a noncitizen has a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, requiring a showing of the 
client’s agreement with counsel and how the attorney did not comply with that agreement, 
requiring that the attorney be informed of and allowed to respond to the claims, and mandating 
that the complaint be filed with the attorney’s professional disciplinary authority.44 Despite the 
Lozada court’s limited recognition of a potential right to effective representation, some scholars 
have argued that “access to counsel could be protected under the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, because if you cannot access your lawyer, presumably she cannot assist you 
effectively.”45 However, the courts have not adopted this view, and due process claims by 
noncitizen litigants who are unable to procure counsel have generally proven unsuccessful under 
Lozada’s stringent standards.46 
 
39 Id. 
40 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a standard for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims).  
41 Padilla, supra note 38, at 366. 
42 See Lozada v. I.N.S., 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).   
43 Id. at 13. 
44 Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (1988). 
45 Note, The Right to Be Heard From Immigration Prisons: Locating a Right of Access to Counsel for Immigration 
Detainees in the Right of Access to Courts, supra note 22, at 732. 
46 See, e.g., Nikollbibaj v. Gonzales, 232 Fed.Appx. 546, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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B. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the statutory authority for immigration law, 
provides that a noncitizen has “the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, 
by counsel of the alien’s choosing . . . .”47 The INA further provides an alien the right to “have a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own 
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government . . . .”48 The limited rights 
conferred by the INA are effectively inaccessible to respondents in immigration proceedings where 
the statutes do not confer a simultaneous right to government-funded counsel.49 
The courts have increasingly recognized that constitutional rights and liberty interests can be 
implicated in immigration proceedings.50 The Ninth Circuit has held that “accurate and just results 
are most likely to be obtained through equal contest of opposed interests” in the court’s adversarial 
setting, affirming a public policy interest in ensuring effective representation for litigants with a 
liberty interest at stake.51 Moreover, in applying the Mathews test, the Ninth Circuit has recognized 
that “the government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined 
not to be a danger in the community and whose appearance at further immigration proceedings can 
be reasonably ensured.”52 The “significant risk that [an] individual will be needlessly deprived of 
the fundamental right to liberty” are at the core of the liberty interests imagined in the 
Constitution’s conferral of procedural due process rights.53 Thus, the courts consideration of 
whether the appointment of counsel for an indigent noncitizen would be necessary to satisfy the 
 
47 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
48 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012).  
49 See Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).  
50 See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19; Hernandez, supra note 37; Lozada, supra note 42, at 13. 
51 Lassiter, supra note 31, at 28. 
52 Hernandez, supra note 36, at 993. 
53 Id. 
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Fifth Amendment’s requirements of “fundamental fairness” and procedural due process was a 
logical step in the analysis of immigrants’ constitutional rights.54  
In Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, the Sixth Circuit examined whether an immigrant respondent was 
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel during his deportation hearing.55 The Court 
conceded that if a provision of the INA were not to provide an alien with procedural due process, 
the statutory requirements of the INA would have to “yield [to] the constitutional guarantee of due 
process [and] must provide adequate protection during the deportation process.”56 “The test for 
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a 
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness the 
touchstone of due process.’”57 The Court determined that, where assistance of counsel could not 
have resulted in a different decision by the Immigration Judge, the lack of counsel “did not prevent 
full administrative consideration of his argument.”58 Thus, fundamental fairness “was not 
abridged, and the order of deportation [was] not subject to constitutional attack for a lack of due 
process.”59 The Sixth Circuit’s decision, although denying the petitioner’s due process claim here, 
created a potential (albeit limited) window for procedural due process claims where immigrant 
respondents’ inability to procure counsel results in a fundamentally unfair proceeding.60 
However, the Aguilera-Enriquez dissent highlights the shortcomings of a case-by-case 
“fundamental fairness” analysis.61 Justice DeMascio argued that “because the consequences of a 
 
54 Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19; see also Walter S. Gindin, Note, (Potentially) Resolving the Ever-Present Debate 
Over Whether Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings Have a Due-Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 669, 679-80 (2011). 
55 Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 567. 
56 Id. at 568. 
57 Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).   
58 Id. at 569. 
59 Id. at 568. 
60 Gindin, supra note 54, at 680. 
61 Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). 
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deportation proceeding parallels punishment for crime, only a per se rule requiring appointment of 
counsel will assure a resident alien due process of law.”62 Justice DeMascio critiqued the 
majority’s case-by-case approach to fundamental fairness, emphasizing that procedural due 
process cannot be ensured without a constitutional guarantee of counsel.63 Moreover, the 
dissenting opinion noted:  
When the government, with plenary power to exclude, agrees to allow an alien lawful resident, 
it is unconscionable for the government to unilaterally terminate that agreement without 
affording an indigent resident alien assistance of appointed counsel. Expulsion is such lasting 
punishment that meaningful due process can require no less. Assuredly, it inflicts punishment 
as grave as the institutionalization which follow an In re Gault finding of delinquency. A 
resident alien’s right to due process should not be tempered by a classification of the 
deportation proceeding as “civil”, “criminal”, or “administrative.” No matter the classification, 
deportation is punishment, pure and simple.64 
 
Yet, even as courts conceptually recognize that Fifth Amendment principles of due process and 
fundamental fairness may require a right to counsel in immigration proceedings, courts’ reluctance 
to adopt the Aguilera test, to confer this right onto immigrants, and to hold unconstitutional those 
provisions of the INA that constructively restrict noncitizens’ access to counsel has its most 
detrimental effects on those least capable of representing themselves—children.65  
C. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) proposes minimum 
universal standards for the protection of children’s human rights, particularly in the context of 
 
62 Id. at 573 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 574 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 572. Although dissenting opinion in Aguilera-Enriquez emphasizes the petitioner’s former legal residency as 
a basis for his entitlement to due process, Id. at 572-74, the Supreme Court has long recognized that immigrants are 
entitled to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ constitutional protections. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 
228 (1896). Thus, Justice DeMascio’s argument extends to immigrant respondents without legal status, as well. 
Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 20, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). 
65 Immigrants represented by counsel are fifteen times more likely to seek qualified relief under the INA, and five 
times more like to be granted relief from deportation than those without representation. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven 
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015). Despite the 
Supreme Court’s decision guaranteeing due process to immigrants over one hundred years ago, Yamataya v. Fisher, 
189 U.S. 86 (1903), immigrants who face educational, linguistic, or financial obstacles to legal representation continue 
to be denied full access to counsel and fundamentally fair proceedings. Gindin, supra note 55, at 679. 
 12 
migration.66 The CRC identifies refugee children as independent “rights-bearers” entitled to the 
protection and assistance of receiving governments, intergovernmental organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations.67 Furthermore, the CRC recognizes refugee children’s need for 
special safeguards and care, interpreted contextually with relation to “[the child’s] interactions 
with her specific sociocultural environment and in relation to her developmental experiences.”68 
Scholars and politicians have been unable to consistently define the concept of a “refugee 
child,” and this lack of consensus has resulted in the marginalization of refugee children in 
humanitarian discourse.69 Traditional conceptions of the nuclear family have perceived children 
as an arm of the biological family and not as individuals entitled to their own human rights 
protections.70 Indeed, immigration law reflects traditional conceptions of children as dependent 
beings within the biological family unit in its reliance on the biological determinants of a familial 
relationship instead of the functional determinants that satisfy the day-to-day needs of the child.71  
In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to these traditional conceptions 
when it examined the INA’s limitations on the custodial release of juvenile immigrant detainees.72 
Regulations provided that “alien juveniles ‘shall be released, in order of preference, to: (i) a parent; 
(ii) a legal guardian;  or (iii) an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are not 
 
66 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ART. 22. (“States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with 
applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her 
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of 
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian 
instruments to which the said States are Parties.”).  
67  Id. 
68 Jeanette A. Lawrence, Agnes. E. Dodds, Ida Kaplan, & Maria M. Tucci, The Rights of Refugee Children and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 8 LAWS 20, 2 (2019) (Austl.). 
69 Id. 
70 Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward a Functional 
Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 511 
(2010). 
71 Id. 
72 Reno v. Flores, 506 U.S. 292, 294 (1993). 
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presently in INS detention,’ unless the INS determine[d] that ‘the detention of such juvenile is 
required to secure his timely appearance . . . or to ensure the juvenile’s safety or that of others.’”73 
A class of juvenile detainees sought release from government custody into the care of a “willing-
and-able private custodian,” arguing that the regulation violated both substantive and procedural 
due process by not requiring a case-by-case examination of whether release “to some other 
‘responsible adult’” was in the child’s best interests.74 The Court affirmed the traditional rationale, 
holding that “where a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, where the 
conditions of governmental custody are decent and humane, [government] custody surely does not 
violate the Constitution.”75 The Court continued on to say that “[t]he best interests of the child’ is 
likewise not an absolute and exclusive constitutional criterion for the government’s exercise of the 
custodial responsibilities that it undertakes. . . .”76 
 Moreover, the United States is the only country that has not ratified the CRC.77 Up until 
2015, the only two other countries that had not ratified the CRC were Somalia and South Sudan, 
nations with dismal human rights records.78 The debate over the ratification of the CRC has 
prompted federalism concerns in the United States, where certain procedural and substantive rights 
guaranteed to children can be consistent with state-regulated family law.79 However, in practice, 
“the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United 
States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements,” and, as such, has not 
 
73 Id. at 297 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(b)(1) (1992)).  
74 Id. at 300. 
75 Id. at 303. 
76 Id. at 304. 
77 Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country that Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU 
(November 20, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-
ratified-convention-childrens.   
78 Id. 
79 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402 (1998). 
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uniformly prevented the signing and ratification of treaties historically.80 As such, while the CRC 
outlines a minimal framework for the rights of the child, it serves more as a theoretical guide for 
scholars as opposed to a legal mandate for the American legal system.81 However, some scholars 
retain a belief in the conceptual utility of the CRC for U.S. policy, even absent its ratification. 82 
III.   ACADEMIC REVIEW 
Nationally and internationally, scholars and advocates have argued for a right to counsel for 
children in immigration proceedings. The following sections provide a brief overview of the two 
leading arguments in support of this right: a due process argument and a child-rights argument. 
A. THE DUE PROCESS APPROACH 
The most prevalent argument for a government-funded right to counsel for children is based 
on the assertion that the deprivation of counsel is an inherent violation of the child’s due process 
rights.83 The law governing the evolution of juvenile delinquency proceedings has been instructive 
in this regard.84 Unlike the juvenile delinquency law that grants children limited autonomy while 
simultaneously affording them special protections, immigration law neither entitles children to the 
full rights granted to children in other areas of the law nor grants them the protections otherwise 
afforded in those contexts. Like the juvenile court system, the immigration courts treat eighteen as 
the age of majority, and to a certain degree, immigration law has recognized age as categorically 
 
80 Id. at 393-94. 
81 See Jennifer Kasper & Paul Wise, The Relevance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child for 
United States Domestic Policy: Welfare Reform and Children in Immigrant Families, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (VOL. 5, NO. 2) 64, 74 (2001). 
82 See Id. 
83 See, e.g., Sharon Finkel, Notes & Comments, Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed Counsel for 
Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105, 1107 (2001); Genieva A. Hylton, Note, Justice for All: The 
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 157, 171 (2017). 
84 Samantha Casey Wong, Note, Perpetually Turning Our Backs to the Most Vulnerable: A Call for the Appointment 
of Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors in Deportation Proceedings, 46 CONN. L. REV. 853, 870 (2013).  
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distinguishing the needs of children from those of adults. 85 Further, in the context of juvenile 
rights, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the “acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from 
the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated 
differently from adults.”86 However, immigration law’s failure to distinguish between adults and 
children with regard to procedural accommodations relevant to those distinct needs effectively 
diminishes children’s access to the due process rights to which they are entitled.87 
Indeed, the Court’s position in Bellotti v. Baird has provided much of the basis for the argument 
that due process demands a government-funded right to counsel for children in immigration law.88 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute 
that required parental consent in order for a minor to access an abortion.89 The Court conceded 
that “although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against 
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account 
for children’s vulnerability” and can “limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the 
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”90 Given the 
severity of the abortion decision and the long-term ramifications of not being able to access an 
abortion, the Court found the statute unconstitutional where it would restrict access to a remedy 
even where a minor was deemed mature, competent, and entitled to make the decision.91 The 
Court’s decision acknowledged that a qualified right does not necessarily provide an effective 
avenue to access that right, particularly to children who, due to age, are legally vulnerable.92 Given 
 
85 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012) (defining an unaccompanied minor as being under the age of 18); 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.10(c) (2013) (prohibiting legal admissions by unrepresented minors in immigration proceedings). 
86 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). 
87 Finkel, supra note 83, at 1129-30. 
88 See, e.g., Finkel, supra note 83, at 1129-30; Wong, supra note 84, at 871. 
89 Baird, supra note 87, at 635. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 651. 
92 Id. at 647.  
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the emphasis on the long-term consequences, the Court’s logic underscores the importance of the 
accessibility of a right in determining a statute’s constitutionality.93 Thus, some scholars have 
argued that any right to counsel granted to children by the INA is purely theoretical where most 
children in immigration proceedings will be unable to procure or afford counsel.94 
B. THE CHILD-RIGHTS APPROACH 
Some scholars have argued for a children’s right to counsel in immigration proceedings based 
on children’s autonomy and their fundamental distinction from adults.95 Child-rights, as a legal 
basis for children’s right to counsel, is founded upon international law’s recognition of the 
children’s autonomy and fundamental human rights.96  
The historical development of child rights has traced children’s legal existence from being 
parental property to existing as somewhat-independent persons.97 Human rights theory provides 
the foundation for the assertion of child rights, centering entitlement to certain rights on children’s 
personhood and, thus, qualifying children as rights holders, “even in instances where the child may 
lack capacity to exercise rights autonomously.”98 Given the broad scope and the magnitude with 
which the CRC has been accepted globally for its approach to children’s human rights, scholars 
and policy makers often look to the CRC as a guiding conceptual framework for the analyses of 
 
93 Id. at 652. 
94 Finkel, supra note 83, at 1131 (2001). 
95 See, e.g., Olga Byrne, Promoting a Child’s Rights-Based Approach to Immigration in the United States, 32 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 59 (2017); David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights 
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979 (2002). 
96 See, e.g., Brief for Human Rights Watch as Amicus Curae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, J.E.F.M. et al. v. Lynch, 
837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35738, 15-35739). Counsel for Human Rights Watch, relying on international 
law to emphasize the importance of preserving a forum for children’s claims for a right to appointed counsel, cited to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to international treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and to the Inter-American court system, 
including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  
97 Thronson, supra note 95, at 981 (“Yet, despite skepticism, there is consensus that control of children by parents, or 
the State, is not absolute and that children do have rights.”).  
98 Id. at 988-89. 
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the treatment of children in the U.S.99 More specifically, the CRC provides four key principles 
through which to assess the treatment of children’s rights: non-discrimination in Article 2; the best 
interests of the child in Article 3; the right to participation in Article 12; and the right to life, 
survival, and development in Article 6.100  
First, the CRC’s non-discrimination principle dictates that all children be treated equal, 
regardless of citizenship status or national origin.101 Despite there being no express policies 
directed at the disparate treatment of noncitizen children, the reality is that migrant children are 
perceived by the law, first, as “aliens” and, then, as children.102 The treatment of children under 
immigration law, as a result, deprives children of the protections available to American citizen 
children in other areas of the law, such as a right to counsel in juvenile court.103 Thus, the 
unavailability of this right to children in immigration proceedings effectively discriminates against 
noncitizen children based on their citizenship status.104 
Second, with the exception of SIJS, there is no provision of the INA that requires immigration 
officials to consider the best interests of the child in making an immigration determination.105 
Moreover, noncitizen children do not have an inherent right to participate in immigration 
 
99 See Id.; Byrne, supra note 95; see also Roper v. Simmons, 542 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005). In Roper, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, makes specific reference to the standards outlined in the CRC proscribing the use of capital 
punishment against juveniles under the age of 18. 
100 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD; see also Byrne, supra note 95, at 77. 
101 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ART. 2.  
102 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2009). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (“In modern times, popular American culture, taking a hint from the terminology of the immigration laws, often 
demonizes current and prospective immigrants as ‘aliens’ or, even worse, ‘illegal aliens.’ Class and racial aspects of 
the stereotypes contribute to the conventional wisdom that immigrants are a pressing social problem necessitating 
extreme measures.”).  
105 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). SIJS, again, is only available to children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected. 
Id. SIJS-eligible noncitizen children must, first, be determined to be unable to reunify with a parent by a state court, 
and it is the state court that assesses the best interests of the child in returning to their country of origin. Id. 
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proceedings.106 “Adults and decision-makers must be equally mindful to carry out their duties on 
both sides of this spectrum: to adequately fulfill younger, or more dependent children’s right to 
participate while also respecting more mature children’s ability to carry and express their own 
views.”107 Where the CRC emphasizes children’s agency and simultaneous need for protections, 
U.S. immigration law does not reflect this ideal.108 
Finally, a child’s right to development and survival is particularly implicated in the context of 
family separation and detention practices.109 There are limited protections available for migrant 
children who meet the INA’s stringent eligibility requirements for “refugee” status110 and for 
victims of trafficking, but the vast majority of migrant children do not qualify for these 
protections.111 Children’s legal, physical, and mental health needs are jeopardized under the 
current U.S. immigration regime,112 and scholars advocating for a child-rights approach suggest a 
critical need for reform in the best interests of children regardless of nationality.113 
In sum, the child-rights approach to immigration policy calls for the recognition of children’s 
independent rights while also protecting their need for protection and assistance.114 Using the CRC 
as a theoretical framework against which to analyze U.S. immigration policy, scholars critically 
 
106 Indeed, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4 provides that, “when it is impracticable for the respondent to be present at the hearing 
because of mental incompetency,” the courts can ask another party, whether it be an attorney, family member, or 
custodian, to appear on the respondent’s behalf. This can apply to children deemed mentally incompetent to appear in 
court, but it does not categorically apply to children based on their developmental limitations.  
107 Byrne, supra note 95, at 93-94. 
108 Id. (“This dynamic comes into play in the context of children’s asylum claims. . . . [Y]oung people seeking 
protection based on their political opinions have faced skepticism or even incredulity of decision-makers who may 
hold assumptions that children are unable to hold political views.”). On the other hand, children who are derivatives 
of a parent’s asylum claim do not make their own claim for relief and lack the ability to participate in the process. 
Nadwa Mossad, Refugees and Asylees: 2017, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2017). 
109 See JOANNE M. CHIEDI, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., CARE PROVIDER FACILITIES DESCRIBED 
CHALLENGES ADDRESSING MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF CHILDREN IN HHS CUSTODY (2019).  
110 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014). 
111 See Byrne, supra note 95, at 77-78. 
112 See CHIEDI, supra note 109.  
113 See Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child Principle to Protect 
Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 131 (2006).  
114 See Thronson, supra note 95. 
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point to the law’s disregard for children’s independent rights except in the cases of unaccompanied 
children who are treated wholly as adults115 and to its inconsistency with international norms for 
the protection of all children, regardless of whether they are migrants are citizens.116 
IV. IMMIGRATION LAW AND CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
This paper takes a distinct approach to finding a right to government-funded counsel for 
children in immigration proceedings. Where criminal courts provide a right-to-counsel for all 
criminal defendants because of costs of deprivation of liberty and delinquency courts afford a right 
to counsel to incompetent minors based on their cognitive abilities, immigration courts have only 
begun to recognize the need for counsel for mentally incompetent respondents. The Supreme Court 
recognizes that a child’s mental capacity and cognitive development categorically distinguish him 
from an adult and require special procedural protections, but immigration law has not yet 
implemented the necessary changes to address children’s vulnerabilities. This paper argues that 
children’s cognitive development, in addition to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
constitutional mandate for additional procedural due process protections for children, demands a 
right to counsel for children in immigration proceedings. 
A. CHILDREN AND CRIMINAL LAW  
Over the course of the twentieth century, the historical development of a right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings demonstrated an increasing recognition of the potential prejudicial and 
 
115 Id. at 1000 (“Given that the procedural framework of immigration law fails to recognize that children exist without 
parents, substantive and procedural rules do virtually nothing to account for the possibility of children in proceedings 
unaccompanied by parents.”). 
116 Byrne, supra note 96, at 90 n.17. Byrne notes that, where the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program had 
approximately 1,300 children enrolled as of October 2017, CBP reported that almost 60,000 unaccompanied children 
had been apprehended by the end of 2016. By the end of the 2018 fiscal year, 50,036 unaccompanied children had 
been detained at the U.S. southern border by CBP. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Southwest 
Border Apprehensions by Sector FY 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2018).  
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disparate impacts that lack of legal representation could have on criminal defendants.117 The Court 
has evolved from declaring a constitutional right to counsel only where an indigent defendant is 
charged with a capital offense118 to upholding a right to counsel for all defendants charged of any 
crime that risks “that actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.”119 Indeed, in extending an 
unequivocal right to counsel in felony proceedings, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright stated: 
“[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him. . . . [O]ur state and national constitutions and laws have laid great 
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial 
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized 
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”120  
Even before the Court guaranteed a right to counsel for all criminal defendants facing a loss of 
liberty, the Court began to recognize that certain circumstances could give rise to a heightened 
demand for the appointment of counsel.121 Specifically, the Court in Wade v. Mayo122 
acknowledged that young and mentally incompetent individuals would require the appointment of 
 
117 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (“[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ 
counsel, and is incapable of adequately making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, 
or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of 
due process of law. . . .”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-244 (1936) (“We concluded that certain 
fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against state action by the due process of law clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in criminal 
prosecution.”). 
118 Powell, supra note 117. 
119 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 9, at 344 (“Not only 
these precedents, but also reason and reflection, require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him. . . .”).  
120 Gideon, supra note 9, at 344. 
121 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (“To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the 
States in this matter would be to impose upon them, as Judge Bond points out, a requirement without distinction 
between criminal charges of different magnitudes or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction.”). Although the Court 
departed from the Betts rationale in Gideon, the Betts approach gave way to factual analyses of right-to-counsel claims 
in non-criminal cases, many of which were overturned by the Court for failure to appoint counsel.  
122 Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9. 
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counsel in criminal proceedings because “[t]here are some individuals who, by reason of age, 
ignorance or mental capacity are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution 
of a relatively simple nature . . . [and] [w]here such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint 
counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.”123 Thus, the evolution 
of the Court’s treatment of a right to counsel presents two major points. First, the transition to a 
more generalized recognition of a right to counsel, rooted in a belief that fundamental fairness 
cannot be achieved in a system where the layman is expected to defend himself against the 
expertise of an experienced government attorney, demonstrates the Court’s willingness to expand 
the scope of an individual’s right to counsel where due process rights are at risk.124 Second, the 
Court has recognized that individuals’ abilities to access a fundamentally fair court proceeding 
could be impaired by such factors as age,125 ignorance, or mental competency.126 
Since Wade v. Mayo, the Court has further elaborated on the mitigating effects of age and 
competency on culpability in the juvenile-criminal context.127 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged 
 
123 Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9, at 684; see also Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 
U.S. 134, 136-38 (1951).  
124 See Massey v. Moore, supra 123, at 108-09 (“We have not allowed convictions to stand if the accused stood trial 
without the benefit of counsel and yet was so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient as not to be able to 
comprehend the legal issues involved in his defense. No trial can be fair. That leaves the defense to a man who is 
insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court. 
Even the sane layman may have difficulty discovering in a particular case the defenses which the law allows.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
125 Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9, at 684; see also Massey v. Moore, supra note 123, at 108-09; Palmer v. Ashe, supra 
note 123, at 136-38. 
126 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (holding that, in the criminal context, a person is not competent to 
stand trial if “he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with 
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense”).  
127 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, supra note 99, at 568-67 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, as any 
parents knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, a lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. . 
. . The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure. . . . This is explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less 
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment. . . . The third broad difference is that the character 
of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less 
fixed.”).  
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the fundamental neurological and psychological differences between juveniles and adults and 
conceded that a juvenile’s culpability and, consequentially, punishment cannot be equated to that 
of an adult.128 Juveniles are ill-equipped to assess the nature of the consequences of certain choices, 
ill-experienced to have the judgment to avoid detrimental choices, and not competent to defend 
themselves before the law.129 Juveniles’ abilities to advocate on their own behalf and comprehend 
their interests are notably impaired because of their age, particularly in situations where the 
juvenile can be susceptible to coercion or duress.130 “The law has historically reflected the same 
assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and 
possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”131 As such, the criminal 
courts have categorically distinguished children and juveniles from adults in this context.132  
B. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURTS 
Wade v. Mayo presented the Court’s first unequivocal affirmation in the criminal right-to-
counsel context that children have categorically distinct due process needs by virtue of their age.133 
 
128 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2011) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. . . . It remains true that from a moral standpoint it would 
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.” (internal citations omitted)); Roper v. Simmons, supra note 100, at 571 (“[I]f 
the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the 
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. The same conclusions 
follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender.” (internal citations omitted)).  
129 Baird, supra note 86, at 635.  
130 See Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, Campaign for Youth 
Justice, Center for Law, Brain and Behavior, Civitas Childlaw Center, National Juvenile Justice Network, Juvenile 
Justice Network, Phillips Black Project, Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, W. Haywood. Burns Institute, and Youth 
Law Center in Support of Petitioner Dassey. V.  Dittman, No. 12-1172, 6-7 (2018) (“In re Gault, for example, this 
Court emphasized that certain pressures might cause a person, especially one of defective mentality or peculiar 
temperament to falsely confess because the untrue acknowledgement of guilt is at the time the more promising of two 
alternatives between which he is obliged to choose. . . . Conduct under duress involves a choice and conduct devoid 
of physical pressure but not leaving a free exercise of choice is the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting 
physical restraint.”).  
131 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.  261, 273 (2011).  
132 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, supra note 9 (proscribing the death penalty in cases of juvenile offenders); Graham 
v. Florida, supra note 128 (proscribing life sentences for juvenile nonhomicide crime); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, supra 
note 131 (holding that a child suspect’s age informs the legality of police questioning).  
133 Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9. 
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Recognizing youth as a disadvantage that compromises a defendant’s ability to adequately represent 
himself, the Court determined that the defendant was “an inexperienced youth incapable of 
adequately representing himself even in a trial which apparently involved no complicated legal 
questions.”134 Thus, the denial of appointed counsel denied him of due process of law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.135 This 1948 decision preceded the Court’s decision in Gideon, suggesting 
that the Court has long recognized age to be a pivotal factor in the determination of procedural 
fairness.136 However, the Court did not extend procedural due process protections to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings until almost two decades later.137 
In the 1960s, the federal courts began to examine questions of the scope of the constitutional 
rights afforded to children in juvenile court proceedings.138 In Kent v. United States, the Court 
declined to declare that the same protections afforded to adults in criminal proceedings would 
apply to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.139 It nonetheless conceded: “There is 
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”140 One year later, the Court extended this view 
 
134 Id., at 683. 
135 Id., at 684. The Wade decision identified a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the 
Fifth Amendment, because the case examined the denial of appointed counsel at the state trial level. Id. at 675.  
136 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 9 with Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9. 
137 See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
138 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 106 (1965) (holding that “[t]he need [for assistance of counsel] is 
even greater in the adjudication of waiver [of Juvenile Court jurisdiction] . . . since it contemplates the imposition of 
criminal sanctions”); Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (1964) (holding that a child’s attorney must be granted 
full access to information available to the juvenile court in the determination of jurisdictional waiver in order to 
provide effective assistance); Kent, supra note 137, at 555 (“While there can be no doubt of the original laudable 
purpose of the juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual 
performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable to immunity of the process from the 
reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults.”).  
139 Kent, supra note 137, at 561-62 (“The right of representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging 
gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of justice. . . . We do not mean this to indicate that the hearing 
to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; 
but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”).  
140 Id., at 556. 
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even further, doing away with the distinction between adult and juvenile proceedings where the 
loss of liberty is at stake.141 In In re Gault, the Court reasoned that a juvenile needs the assistance 
of a counsel to navigate the complex processes of a legal proceeding, to ensure procedural fairness, 
and to mount an effective defense where the consequences could curtail the child’s freedom.142 As 
such, the Court conferred a right to government-funded counsel in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings as a requirement for due process.143  
Since then, debates surrounding theories of justice in the quasi-criminal context of juvenile 
proceedings continue to raise questions around the fairness of procedures that do not afford children 
all of the protections available to adults in criminal proceedings.144 As Benjamin Good has 
observed, the juvenile court system often finds itself balancing two competing conceptions of the 
State-child relationship: the view that a child is dependent on the State as parens patriae and that 
the State has the duty to protect the child’s best interests, and the position that a child is the State’s 
adversary where the child has violated some social responsibility.145 Indeed, this paradox of the 
juvenile delinquency system has both propelled the expansion of legal protections to children while 
limiting the Court’s treatment of children’s entitlement to all legal protections.146 
However, some scholars argue that, even where the Court has expanded procedural protections 
to children in juvenile court, procedural justice requires a standard specific to the needs of children 
 
141 In re Gault, supra note 20, at 36. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 41. 
144 See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1447 
(2009); David R. Katner, Eliminating the Competency Presumption in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, 24 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 403 (2015); Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile 
Delinquency Proceedings—Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 
629 (1995). 
145 Benjamin Good, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 109, 122 (2014). 
146 Id. 
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instead of a mere extension of the adult standard.147 The fundamental basis for the distinction 
between adults and children in criminal and juvenile proceedings has been that age and maturity 
are critical determinants of a child’s capacity to stand trial.148 “The ongoing process of adolescent 
development can amplify mental illness or intellectual disabilities that are already affecting a 
youth’s competence. And the developmental immaturity alone can raise concerns about a youth’s 
competence to stand trial.”149 Thus, the role of an attorney in advocating on behalf of a child goes 
beyond solely mounting an effective legal defense.150 Attorneys often have to account for 
inconsistent client information resulting from impaired memory and comprehension151 and 
emotional stress and trauma that impacts a child’s ability to process information and make 
decisions,152 and must then be able to communicate complex legal information to a less-than-
competent juvenile client.153  
 
147 Birckhead, supra note 144, at 1505; see also Tiffani N. Darden, Constitutionally Different: A Child’s Right to 
Substantive Due Process, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 211, 250 (2018). 
148 Cowden et al., supra note 144, at 633 (“. . . [a] child under the age of seven had no criminal capacity or 
responsibility; at fourteen, a child had the same capacity as an adult; and between the ages of seven and fourteen, a 
rebuttable presumption of incapacity existed, with a duty on the government to prove capacity beyond a reasonable 
doubt. These references to age were to physical or chronological age, not mental age. The establishment of the juvenile 
justice system was in part a result of this perceived difference in criminal capacity based on age and in part a response 
to growing recognition of the special needs of children.”).  
149 Katner, supra note 144, at 418. 
150 Cowden et al., supra note 144, at 642-43 (discussing the enhanced duties of attorneys where clients’ physical and 
mental conditions present issues of competency); id. at 645 (“The fundamental decisions in the process, such as 
whether to accept diversion with conditions, the nature of the plea to be entered, whether to testify, and whether to 
appeal, . . . are decisions to be made by the child after full consultation with the lawyer . . . . In this regard there is 
really no. distinction between representing a juvenile and an adult.”) 
151 Cowden et al., supra note 144, at 643 n.83 (noting the impact of post-traumatic stress on memory recall).  
152 Jennifer K. Pokempner, Riya Saha Shah, Mark F. Houldin, Michael J. Dale & Robert G. Schwartz, The Legal 
Significance of Adolescent Development on the Right to Counsel: Establishing the Constitutional Right to Counsel for 
Teens in Child Welfare Matters and Assuring a Meaningful Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 529, 532-33 (2012) (“[P]sychosocial factors influence adolescents’ perceptions, judgments, and decision-
making abilities, and limit their capacity to autonomous choice. . . . Youth may be less likely to perceive the long-
term consequences of their decisions without guidance and feedback. These findings are consistent with 
neuroscientific research, showing that areas of the brain associated with impulse control, judgment, and the rational 
integration of cognitive, social, and emotional information do not fully mature until early adulthood.”).  
153 Cowden et al., supra note 144, at 642-43 (discussing the enhanced duties of attorneys where clients’ physical and 
mental conditions present issues of competency); id. at 645 (“The fundamental decisions in the process, such as 
whether to accept diversion with conditions, the nature of the plea to be entered, whether to testify, and whether to 
appeal, . . . are decisions to be made by the child after full consultation with the lawyer . . . . In this regard there is 
really no. distinction between representing a juvenile and an adult.”).  
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Although the juvenile courts, which are technically civil forums, now recognize a right to 
counsel based on children’s inherent developmental limitations, this right has not been extended 
to another class of quasi-criminal, civil proceedings—immigration courts.154 Neither adults nor 
children are afforded a judicially-recognized right to counsel in immigration court notwithstanding 
that the possibility of removal poses the risk of a deprivation of liberty in the event of an adverse 
immigration decision.155 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recognition of a categorical distinction 
between children and adults has not translated into meaningful procedural changes or protections 
for children in the immigration context.156 This inconsistency in the legal treatment of children 
both deprives children of due process and of their unique human rights, but the immigration courts 
are increasingly recognizing that mental incompetency drastically impacts a respondent’s access 
to relief,157 which presents the immigration courts the opportunity to expand its interpretation of 
mental incompetency to include children’s limited developmental capacities. 
C. MATTER OF M-A-M- AND MENTAL COMPETENCY IN IMMIGRATION 
COURT 
 
The respondent in Matter of M-A-M- was a Jamaican citizen who was lawfully admitted to the 
United States as a child but who was served a Notice to Appear158 charging him with removability 
based on multiple convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude in 2008.159 The respondent had 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia and indicated that he required medication, had not been treated 
 
154 Lopez-Mendoza, supra note 11. 
155 Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19. 
156 The INA does proscribe the admission of removal by a child without the representation of counsel. 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.10(c). However, this does not confer a right to counsel in a removal proceeding.  
157 See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011).  
158 “In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title, written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to 
appear’) shall be given in person to the alien . . . specifying the following: (A) The nature of the proceedings against 
the alien. (B) The legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted. (C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in 
violation of the law. (D) The charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated . . .”  
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2019). 
159 A crime of moral turpitude is vaguely defined as a “depraved or immoral act, or a violation of the basic duties owed 
to fellow man, or recently as a ‘reprehensible act’ with a mens rea of at least recklessness.” IMMIGRANT LEGAL 
RESOURCE CENTER, § N.7 CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE (2013).  
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while detained, and wished to see a psychiatrist.160 The court denied his requests for 
accommodations for his mental illness, including a change of venue to be located closer to his 
attorney and family.161 Although initially indicating that he was unable to represent himself, the 
respondent eventually said that he “believed” that he could answer the questions put to him by the 
judge and the DHS attorney, and the Immigration Judge proceeded with the merits hearing where 
respondent appeared pro se.162 At the commencement of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) appeal, there was no indication that the respondent had ever seen a psychiatrist, and, 
through counsel, the respondent’s argument rested on the Immigration Judge’s failure to properly 
assess his mental competency.163 
On review, the BIA examined three principles issues: “(1) When should Immigration Judges 
make competency determinations? (2) What factors should Immigration Judges consider and what 
procedures should they employ to make those determinations? (3) What safeguards should 
Immigration Judges prescribe to ensure that proceedings are sufficiently fair when competency is 
not established?”164 The BIA submitted that, although immigration proceedings are civil in nature, 
the well-developed criminal law treatment of mental competency would be instructive to the 
questions of competency in immigration law.165 As such, the BIA adopted the Supreme Court’s 
definition of mental incompetency almost verbatim,166 stating that “the test for determining 
 
160 Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 475. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 476. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 478. This point, alone, arguably undermines the distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings in the 
context of immigration hearings. This paper argues that a right to counsel in immigration proceedings based on mental 
competency should, too, follow the criminal and juvenile law’s recognition that mentally incompetent individuals are 
unable to understand that nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, and to assist in their own 
defense. This definition of incompetency, adopted by the Supreme Court in Drope, supra note 126, categorically 
applies to all children, as children are developmentally unable to comprehend the scope of the proceedings and to 
make long-term decisions while rationally understanding the implications. See Pokempner, et al, supra note 153. 
166 See Drope, supra note 126.   
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whether an alien is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is whether he or she has 
a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with 
the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and 
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.”167  
As a threshold matter, the BIA affirmed that all respondents have a presumption of competency 
that can only be rebutted “if an Immigration Judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the respondent is unable because of a mental disorder to perform any of the functions listed in the 
definition of competence to represent oneself.”168 Competence is not an observable incapacity in 
and of itself but, rather, is indicated by behavioral signs that a person may lack the ability to 
perform a function demanded in a particular situation.169 Indicia of incompetency could include 
observations of certain behaviors, such as the inability to stay on topic or a high level of distraction, 
or other evidence of mental illness or incompetence, such as medical reports, past judicial, medical, 
or school assessments, or affidavits from friends and family.170  
Prior to M-A-M-, the INA prescribed safeguards for mentally incompetent individuals where 
it would be impracticable for the person to be present at the proceeding.171 The INA required 
additional safeguards for unaccompanied and incompetent individuals and prevented immigration 
judges from accepting admissions of removability. 172 However, the INA did not provide a 
framework for assessing the competency of the individual and, as such, left determinations of 
mental competency up to the discretion of individual judges.173 The BIA decision in Matter of M-
 
167 Compare Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 479 with Drope, supra note 126.  
168 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED PROCEDURAL 
PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (2013). 
169 Id.  
170 Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 479-80. 
171 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006).  
172 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).  
173 Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 478. 
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A-M-, in this regard, provided the immigration courts with the first such framework that limited 
the practicable identification of incompetent respondents.174 
Despite expanding the protections for mentally incompetent individuals, Matter of M-A-M- 
limited an immigration judge’s duties in cases of possible incompetency to the simple requirement 
of an assessment of competency and the implementation of safeguards.175 A competency 
assessment could constitute a psychiatric evaluation or simply a series of simple questions to the 
respondent, and remains within the discretion of the individual immigration judge.176 Similarly, 
the BIA did not prescribe minimum requirements for the safeguards to be implemented to protect 
the interests of an incompetent respondent.177  So, while Matter of M-A-M- provides only limited 
protections for individuals who are unable to participate in their claims for relief, the BIA decision 
puts forth a vague definition of competency that could potentially be expansive enough to include 
children, whose cognitive development renders them unable to fulfill all of the functions required 
of an immigration proceeding.178 
V.  A SCIENCE-BASED ARGUMENT FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL  
Research has repeatedly confirmed that many juveniles and most children under the age of 
fourteen are not competent to understand legal proceedings and participate in the defense of their 
 
174 Matter of M-A-M- left the task of identifying signs of incompetency to immigration judges, legal experts who are 
likely insufficiently qualified to make comprehensive and accurate psychological determinations about individuals 
with whom they have limited interactions. For example, the BIA stated that a diagnosis of mental illness would not 
automatically result in a finding of incompetency. Id. at 480. An immigration judge who has no medical training and 
who took no part in the respondent’s diagnosis would be ill-equipped to understand the nuanced nature of mental 
illness and its effects on the respondent’s decision-making and reasoning capacities.  
175 Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 480-81. 
176 Id. 
177 Interestingly, Matter of M-A-M- makes specific reference to the use of an attorney as a qualifying safeguard, where 
an attorney was able to introduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and secure testimony from a doctor about the 
respondent’s medical condition. See Matter of M-A-M-, supra note 157, at 482 (referencing Matter of H-, 6 I. & N. 
Dec. 358 (BIA 1954)). 
178 This paper argues that children’s developmental and psychosocial limitations fall within the scope of this 
definition of incompetency, as children are unable to fully understand the scope of the immigration law, the 
proceedings, or the long-term implications. 
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claims for relief.179 Given the quasi-adversarial nature of immigration proceedings and the BIA’s 
reliance on criminal and juvenile delinquency law in treating the issue of competency, immigration 
law’s reluctance to extend special procedural safeguards to children runs counter to accepted legal 
authority on the issue. Moreover, immigration law largely ignores accepted scientific evidence that 
juveniles as a whole lack the biological development necessary to understand and access their 
rights without the guaranteed assistance of a qualified adult, here legal counsel. Children’s capacity 
to appear coherent at an immigration proceeding does not equate to competency to understand the 
proceeding or its implications, and reliance on an immigration judge to make that distinction puts 
the task of evaluating a child’s psychosocial performance in the hands of an individual whose 
expertise lies in the law.  
Children’s competency can be influenced by any number of factors, such as cognitive and 
intellectual abilities, mental health disorders, their development, and their behavior.180 The bases 
for indicating incompetency can be influenced by physical disabilities; educational and cultural 
backgrounds; language, vocabulary, and comprehension, trauma and migration-related factors, 
and custodial placement and post-release accommodations.181 Needless to say, the assessment of 
mental competency and capacities of a migrant child, who more often than not cannot even 
communicate with an immigration judge in the same language,182 are critically impaired within 
the framework provided by the BIA in Matter of M-A-M-. A migrant child’s access to relief should 
not be vested in an immigration judge’s limited ability to assess the complex and nuanced nature 
of a child’s mental state, particularly where significant numbers of those children are 
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180 VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE’S UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN PROGRAM, PRACTICE ADVISORY, “CHILDREN IN 
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182 See Margaret Graham Tebo, Children Without a Country: Thousands of Kids Arrive Each Year Without an Adult 
and Without Knowing English, Lacking a Lawyer. They Face a Daunting Legal System, 90 A.B.A.J 40, 47 (2004). 
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unaccompanied, have suffered some form of trauma, have low-educational levels, and may have 
other underlying mental health issues.183 Rather, the scientific knowledge available about 
children’s limited capacities should compel the provision of legal safeguards that guarantee 
children procedural due process vis-à-vis a right to counsel.184  
The brains of juveniles are biologically distinct from those of adults.185 Adolescence marks the 
most dynamic period of brain development for juveniles.186 Throughout adolescence, the brain 
undergoes the process of strengthening connections among its different regions, despite the brain’s 
physical development being almost complete.187 Scientists have used a variety of magnetic 
resonance imaging (“MRI”) technologies, such as the structural MRI, diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI), and functional MRI to verify theories about the developmental stage of adolescence and 
structural and neural changes in the brain, as well as to analyze the real-time responses of subjects 
to stimuli.188 Specifically, examinations of the prefrontal cortex (“PFC”) reveal that it takes longer 
for the PFC to develop than other areas of the brain and that “the subcortical basal ganglia are 
implicated in numerous functions,” such as behavior selection and cognitive coordination.189  
Scientists have demonstrated that the relatively late development of the PFC is linked to 
the maturation of its connections with impulse-generating and emotion-gathering parts of the 
brain,190  and juveniles in the adolescent stage of development do not have the same physiological 
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brain functions as an adult.191 Indeed, studies indicate that “adult brains specialize particular 
prefrontal regions for certain tasks, whereas children’s prefrontal areas function more diffusely, 
suggesting that neurological development involves both changes within brain regions and among 
their connections.”192 Furthermore, delayed development of the frontal regions of the brain cause 
adolescents to rely heavily on the parts of the brain housing emotional, instead of rational, controls 
when assessing circumstances and making decisions.193  
As Laurence Steinberg’s analysis of the juvenile brain succinctly put it, “[a]dolescent 
immaturity may affect their behavior as defendants in ways that extend beyond competence.”194 
Juveniles’ minds are unstable, at best, unpredictable, at worst, and unreliable in even understanding 
their own best interests in contexts beyond the scope of their comprehension. 
       The adolescent’s cognitive, psychological, social, and moral development is not 
simply a matter of life experience: It has a significant biological basis. New medical 
imaging techniques, such as PET scans and functional MRI, are starting to reveal 
aspects of brain development that take place during adolescence. One is the 
maturation of the frontal lobe that oversees high-level cognitive tasks such as 
hypothetical thinking, logical reasoning, long-range planning, and complex 
decision making. We now know that during adolescence, the frontal lobe is a hub 
of activity: Neurons are wrapping themselves in myelin sheaths that speed the 
transmission of electrical impulses, while the “pruning” of unneeded synaptic 
connections is increasing the efficiency of mental processing. Elsewhere in the 
brain, the limbic system—the center of emotional processing—is increasing its 
connections, paving the way for a better integration of emotional and cognitive 
processes.195 
 
In addition, external elements that affect children’s capacities, cognition, and overall 
development are extremely influential in determining their responses in high-stress situations 
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requiring consequential decision-making concerning unfamiliar subject-matter.196 Developmental 
traumatology has been instructive here, demonstrating the physiological effects of stress on a child 
brain development.197 In spite of this knowledge, DHS, ORR, and immigration enforcement 
agencies have not adequately addressed or accommodated the unique needs of the children in their 
care.198 The Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) reported in September 2019 
that the mental health care needs of children in ORR custody exceeded the current capacity of 
children’s care providers.199 The DHHS reported in September 2019 that the mental health care 
needs of children in ORR custody exceeded the current capacity of children’s care providers.200 
And yet, these children are held to the same legal standards as adults, presumed competent 
to represent their best legal interests and to defend their rights to relief, under the guise of 
fundamental fairness and due process. The combined developmental, psychosocial, intellectual, 
and traumatic/emotional experiences of children uniquely entitle them to special protections that 
are necessary to guarantee them due process. The presumption of competency that extends to 
children in immigration proceedings ignores the very biology underlying the baseline differences 
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between children and adults—age, and the developmental differences resulting from age. This 
presumption of competency assumes that children and adults are equally positioned to fully 
understand their circumstances and claims of relief and articulate their best defenses. This simply 
is biologically impossible. As such, even if an immigration judge assesses a child’s indicia of 
competency to be normal behavior when measured against the average child, those indicia still 
demonstrate a limited capacity to rationally and factually understand and participate in their 
proceedings when compared to an adult.201 The contradictory rationales that the immigration 
courts have continued to use to justify denying children a right to government-funded counsel 
simultaneously denies the science applicable to child development and competency. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he unique role in our society of the family, the institution 
by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural, 
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs 
of parents and children.”202 The lack of accommodations in immigration procedures for children’s 
unique vulnerabilities deviates from the Court’s body of holdings recognizing that children are 
developmentally different and have unique constitutional needs compared to adults.203 The only 
way to adequately conform to the principles established by the Court is to change the procedures 
and limited protections currently in place for children. 
The INA and the BIA’s holdings have established a framework of rules and procedures that 
are wholly inadequate to guaranteeing children fundamentally fair proceedings and procedural due 
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process of law. The following recommendations seek to address a few of the most egregiously 
unjust attributes of immigration’s legal framework. First and foremost, because children are 
categorically unable to represent themselves in a legal proceeding, Congress should amend the 
INA to provide a right to government-funded counsel for all children under the age of eighteen, 
the age of legal maturity. Despite the BIA’s insistence on a presumption of competency for all 
immigration respondents, children are insufficiently cognitively developed to understand, 
participate in, and represent their interests in a proceeding with ramifications as serious as those 
in immigration. As such, the BIA should remove any presumption of competency for children, 
train judges to appropriately handle cases with children, and immediately implement a process to 
assess the need for procedural and psychological safeguards. These could include the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem for younger children, in addition to their counsel, a change of venue to a 
less adversarial setting, or assignment of cases to a judge with special training in children’s cases. 
While the more specific needs of children will vary according to their age, their levels of trauma, 
or the cultures and language, for example, the only way of guaranteeing that these needs are 
accommodated, and their rights are accessed is through the unconditional appointment of counsel. 
Immigration law’s treatment of children disregards the special protections guaranteed to 
children in other areas of the country’s legal system. In addition to the political, racial, and cultural 
implications of continuing to deny immigrant children fair access and representation before the 
law, this paper provides a constitutional argument for a child’s right to counsel in immigration 
proceedings, using the Supreme Court’s own precedents and legal treatment of children to 
highlight the brazen inconsistencies in the treatment of immigrant children. A right to counsel will 
provide immigrant children with the procedural due process of law guaranteed to them by 
Constitution and withheld from them by immigration law.  
